By Adam McConnel
– The writer teaches Turkish history at Sabanci University in Istanbul. He holds an MA and PhD in History from the same university.
ISTANBUL (AA) – Since the 15 July attempted coup by Gulenist elements in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), questions have been raised about the possible effects on Turkish state institutions. Dire warnings have been expressed not only concerning the military branches affected by the purges of suspected Gulen adherents, but about other state institutions, like the police as well as intelligence services. The effects of both the failed putsch and the purges, so the story goes, will render Turkish security forces unable to effectively combat the various threats that the Turkish state and society face in the current juncture. Such warnings are meant to fan negative expectations and fears, and to spread expectations of more violence and more social disorder in Turkey.
The simplest response to this fear mongering is to point out the relevant facts, which the international press has tended to overlook while reporting on post-15 July Turkish events. The reality is that, even though the numbers of people relieved of their duties in state institutions is around 100,000, the Turkish state has 3 million employees. In other words, we are talking about 3-4 percent, a small amount, which quickly reveals why Turkish state institutions have not suffered any major problems in day-to-day functions. That is also why foreign press reports tend to include numbers but neglect percentages and the overall context.
Furthermore, those who have been relieved of their duties are being investigated on a case-by-case basis in order to ensure as much as possible that injustices do not occur. This has been stated repeatedly by government ministers, but foreign press reports again generally ignore the daily public statements from Turkish government officials. Already thousands of civil servants have returned to their posts after investigations showed that their connection to Gulen’s cult was either negligible or did not constitute a threat or a crime. And the number of people who have been arrested and/or jailed in relation to their connection with, either the failed coup attempt or Gulen’s cult, is only a portion of those who have been relieved of their duties.
That is the situation in relation to most civil servants. But what about the security forces? In relation to security, there is another, more important subject than simply how many have been removed from their responsibilities.
In the first day or so after July 15, and as I recovered from the shock of the violence, several questions were occupying my mind. The issue relevant to Turkish state institutions was whether organizations such as the PKK/TAK, DHKP-C, or DAESH would try to take advantage of the putsch’s aftermath to carry out more acts of violence. Or, rather, whether they would have the ability to.
Foreign readers may find the question of “ability” strange. After all, a string of major attacks had taken place in Turkey over the previous year, and several of the most devastating and murderous had struck Turkey’s metropolitan centers, Istanbul and the capital Ankara. Why would those violent militant organizations have difficulty taking advantage of the post-July 15 situation?
However, a matter that most foreign analysts do not seem to have taken seriously was the reason for my focus on those extremists’ ability to carry out attacks. Simply, no one knew exactly to what extent Fetullah Gulen’s adherents had compromised the ability of Turkish security forces to thwart extremist violence.
For the first several days after July 15, the PKK went strangely quiet. For a full four days, no attacks were carried out against Turkish security forces, and when an attack did finally occur it was with long-range weapons. A full week passed before the PKK once again began to target Turkish security forces with improvised explosive devices, or IEDs.
At the same time, Daesh and PKK/TAK attacks in major Turkish urban centers outside of the border areas with Syria abruptly ceased. Thankfully, no further incidents have occurred as Turkish security forces have, according to official statements, prevented dozens of attempts to attack Turkish cities. We all hope that Turkish security forces continue with this success; at the same time, we feel grief and express our condolences for those in the Turkish security forces who have sacrificed their well-being or their lives to protect their society.
The Turkish military, as the entire world is aware, is now engaged with creating a safe zone in Northern Syria. By all accounts, the Turkish military’s performance has been strong and Daesh has been quickly ejected not only from areas near the Turkish border but also further south. Jarabulus was quickly cleared of Daesh elements and now, nearly four months later, tens of thousands of Syrians have returned to the city to rebuild their lives in peace and safety. Dabiq, a town important to Daesh ideology, was taken with relative ease by Syrian opposition forces supported by Turkish arms, logistics, and even firepower. Even though the Turkish military’s performance over the past several years had already been improving, the post-coup situation is even more striking. It is as if shackles and chains have melted away from the Turkish military’s wrists and ankles.
So what is the fretting coming from Washington think tanks and the international media all about? There’s no question that some of it is simply ill will. Over the past five years the malevolence aimed at the democratically elected Turkish political leadership by international observers, journalists, and analysts has been astonishing. But that is a superficial cause for the misplaced analyses of Turkey’s post-coup security forces.
The main factor seems to be a lack of awareness of Gulenist influence in the security forces, or a failure to take that reality seriously. Probably, because international commentators have been obsessed with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, they missed the real story, which is the contest over influence in Turkish state institutions. And those that did understand the connection with state institutions often forgot that one actor, the elected representatives of the Turkish citizenry, has a legitimate legal right to make decisions concerning state institutions while the other actor, a messianic cult, does not have the right to make political decisions.
So as the days after the coup attempt stretched into weeks, and then months, with no major attack in Istanbul or Ankara, and no discernible deterioration in the Turkish military’s operational capacities, the answer became clear. The one minor attack that did happen, the motorcycle bomb detonated on Oct. 6 in Istanbul’s Yenibosna neighborhood, actually illustrated the effectiveness of the security forces: the perpetrators had to use a motorcycle because it is now difficult to obtain vehicles to use for acts of violence, to bring a vehicle to Istanbul for such use, or to devise such a contraption in Istanbul. The PKK militant who drove the motorcycle to Yenibosna was apprehended by security forces within 24 hours, on a highway in Anatolia on his way back to Northern Iraq.
The inescapable conclusion is that Gulen’s followers in the police, the intelligence services, and the military had been, if not actively collaborating with the PKK and Daesh, tacitly allowing those groups to carry out acts of violence. This may be the basic reason for the horrifying violence of the past year. In fact, we should now understand the abhorrent bombings carried out in Turkey’s urban centers and which were the cause of hundreds of deaths as the Gulen cult’s first violent strikes — even if they only facilitated the attacks — in a process that would culminate with them opening fire with heavy weapons on citizens gathered in the streets to resist their putsch. The bombing of the Turkish parliament building, with parliamentarians inside, remains symbolic of Gulen’s full-scale assault on Turkish democracy.
The lesson that foreign analysts now need to absorb is that Turkish state institutions, until recently, were actually weak, hobbled by corruption and unprofessional behavior, and non-transparent. The AK Party began the effort to reform Turkish state institutions 10 years ago when the Turkish military’s constant interjections into the political process were roundly and emphatically rejected by Turkish citizens. Turkish politicians should have been able to spend the past 10 years on restructuring state institutions, making them stronger, more efficient, and transparent, and attacking social problems such as organized crime. But instead, an element which took advantage of previous Turkish state institutional weakness, Gulen’s cult, did not accept or understand the historical and political process that they were caught up in. Subsequently, Turkey suffered nearly an entire decade of political instability while Gulen’s cult tried to extend and preserve its non-democratic power. The loss and trauma to Turkish society have been staggering.
But Turkish state and society are now moving forward. Gulen’s adherents are being uprooted from state institutions. A reform, long overdue, is now being carried out and will continue for the immediate future. Foreign observers need to recognize that the Turkish government should be supported in this effort. Yes, benevolent criticism should be voiced, but real knowledge of the ongoing processes in Turkish state institutions must inform any such criticism.
– Opinions expressed in this piece are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu Agency’s editorial policy.
